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CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT AND SENSITIVE PLACES
Darrell A. H. Miller*
INTRODUCTION
In 2008, with the District of Columbia v. Heller decision, the Supreme Court of
the United States held for the first time that the Second Amendment protects an
individual’s right to keep and bear arms for personal purposes like self-defense in
the home.1 One of the most opaque portions of that decision stated that “nothing in
our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on . . . laws
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and govern-
ment buildings.”2
The “sensitive places” doctrine is still being refined. Courts have held that uni-
versity facilities are sensitive places, as are university events,3 along with national
parks (even when closed),4 and the parking lots of rural post offices.5 Churches and
other houses of worship also appear to qualify6 as do—perhaps—libraries, muse-
ums, day-care facilities, and hospitals.7 However, other courts have struck down, on
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1 554 U.S. 570, 629, 636 (2008).
2 Id. at 626 (emphasis added).
3 DiGiacinto v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 704 S.E.2d 365, 370 (Va. 2011).
4 United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 460 (4th Cir. 2011).
5 Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1125 (10th Cir. 2015).
6 GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1264 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he pre-
existing right codified in the Second Amendment does not include protection for a right to
carry a firearm in a place of worship against the owner’s wishes.”).
7 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 70 F. Supp. 3d 871, 885 (N.D. Ill. 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 846 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Therefore, the City’s regulation requiring ranges to be lo-
cated at least 500 feet away from residential zoning districts, schools, day-care facilities, places
of worship, premises licensed for the retail sale of liquor, children’s activities facilities, libraries,
museums, or hospitals is constitutional.”). Ezell did not strike down the finding of sensitive
places as much as suggest that the designation of sensitive places could not reduce the available
acreage for firing ranges to 2.2% of city’s total acreage out of 10.6% available for business,
commercial, and manufacturing. Ezell, 846 F.3d at 894.
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Second Amendment grounds, regulations that prohibit guns in the vicinity of bars,8
hydro-electric dams,9 and city parks.10
Recently, the matter of sensitive places arrived—almost literally—at the doorstep
of the United States Supreme Court. In United States v. Class, the United States Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit addressed whether a parking lot near Congress quali-
fies as a sensitive place. Rodney Class parked in a lot north of the Botanical Gar-
dens, “approximately 1,000 feet from the entrance to the Capitol [Building] itself,”
with two pistols and a rifle in his car.11 Federal prosecutors charged Class with
violating the federal statute prohibiting firearms on Capitol Building grounds.12
Class claimed the Second Amendment guaranteed him a right to take his firearms
into the parking lot.13 After some procedural maneuvering, including a trip to the
Supreme Court on an unrelated issue,14 the case returned to the D.C. Circuit.15
The Circuit upheld the conviction.16 While granting that the right to keep and bear
arms extends beyond the home, the court reiterated that the right is not limitless.17 One
of those limitations is the sensitive places doctrine.18 And “there are few, if any, govern-
ment buildings more ‘sensitive’ than the ‘national legislature at the very seat of its
operations.’”19 The opinion noted the particular safety needs of government workers
going to and from the Capitol and the government’s right as a property owner—same
as any private property owner—to exclude firearms.20 These rationales—safety and
the government as proprietor—are fairly conventional justifications for the sensitive
places doctrine.21
8 Some of these cases pertain to “buffer-zones” and some to prohibitions on firearms in
parking lots. See, e.g., United States v. Class, 930 F.3d 460, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (holding
that the parking lot outside the United States Capitol building was “sufficiently integrated
with the Capitol for Heller’s sensitive place exception to apply”); Ezell, 846 F.3d at 895–96
(holding that “limiting shooting ranges to manufacturing districts and distancing them from
the multiple and various uses listed in the buffer-zone rule” is unconstitutional).
9 Morris v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1125 (D. Idaho 2014).
10 People v. Chairez, 104 N.E.3d 1158, 1177 (Ill. 2018) (striking down prohibition on “pos-
sessing a firearm within 1000 feet of a public park”).
11 Class, 930 F.3d at 462 (D.C. Cir. 2019); United States v. Class, 38 F. Supp. 3d 19, 22
(D.D.C. 2014).
12 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(1) (2012).
13 Class, 930 F.3d at 462–63.
14 See Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 801–02 (2018).
15 Class, 930 F.3d at 460.
16 Id. at 462.
17 Id. at 463 (citing, inter alia, Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 657–58
(D.C. Cir. 2017)).
18 Id.
19 Id. (citing Jeannette Rankin Brigade v. Chief of Capitol Police, 421 F.2d 1090, 1093
n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
20 Id. at 464.
21 See Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An
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Class went further though. Echoing many gun-rights advocates, he argued a
place cannot be sensitive if the government (or some other person) has abandoned
the role of providing security therein.22 “[U]nlike inside Capitol buildings, which
have extensive security barriers and armed guards at the entrances,” Class argued,
there was no security in the parking lot.23 That lack of security makes the parking
lot a magnet for gun-toting criminals, and hence a “prototypical location where one
would most likely need to exercise a right to self-defense.”24
The court rejected this definition, which would have effectively limited sensitive
places to only those sites that provide adequate security.25 “[W]e do not look to the
‘level of threat’ posed in a sensitive place,” the court noted, observing that schools
and government buildings, like post offices, are open to the public and often lack
special security measures.26 What makes a place sensitive is “the people found there”
or the “activities that take place there.”27
The Class court confirmed a deep truth of the emerging sensitive places doctrine—
ensuring safety is a sufficient, but not a necessary, reason to prohibit firearms in
some places.28 The balance of this Article will explore what it means for a place to
be sensitive, not out of a concern for safety, but because of “the people found there”
or the “activities that take place there.”29 Ultimately, I conclude that one way to
make sense of that portion of the sensitive places doctrine is to recognize that some
places are sensitive because they are sites of conflict between constitutional values.
In order to understand this model of sensitive places, one must accept two re-
lated aspects of rights. First, rights are not always trumps.30 They frequently are
tools to foster and maintain institutions that facilitate a distinctive socio-political
culture.31 Second, rights are not absolute; they can conflict.32 Sensitive places are,
Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1446–47, 1461,
1473 (2009).
22 Class, 930 F.3d at 464–65.
23 Supplemental Opening Brief of Appellant at 24, 930 F.3d 460 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (No.
15-3015), 2018 WL 3007944, at *24; see also Supplemental Reply Brief of Appellant at 4,
United States v. Class, 930 F.3d 460 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (No. 15-3015), 2018 WL 3609036, at
*4 (“[T]he Maryland Avenue parking lot—far from being a place where gun regulations are
presumptively lawful—is an area where Second Amendment rights are at their zenith.”).
24 Id. (citing Volokh, supra note 21, at 1527).
25 Class, 930 F.3d at 464–65.
26 Id. at 465.
27 Id. (quoting GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1319 (M.D. Ga.
2011), aff’d, 687 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012)).
28 See id. at 464–65.
29 GeorgiaCarry.Org, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 1319.
30 See Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meaning, Expressive
Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 731–32 (1998).
31 See generally id. (describing how courts can use these too).
32 See Mark D. Rosen, When Are Constitutional Rights Non-Absolute?, McCutcheon,
Conflicts, and the Sufficiency Question, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1535, 1538 (2015).
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among other things, sites where these rights-enabled and enabling institutions collide.33
For purposes of this Article, I will focus on conflicts between the right to keep and
bear arms and the rights to free exercise of religion, freedom of speech in the edu-
cational context, the fundamental right to vote, and to assemble peaceably in the
public square. However, this list is not definitive: one can imagine a number of other
constitutional rights—like parental rights or the right to privacy—that may come
into play as well.
This Article builds on my prior work, which has explored an institutional approach
to Second Amendment questions, but has not elaborated on the topic of constitutional
conflict.34 Part I explains the ways in which rights are not trumps, but instead produce
institutions that facilitate and constrain certain kinds of rights-enabled behavior.35
Part II explores how rights can come into conflict with each other in three areas of con-
cern: free exercise of religion as it relates to places of worship; freedom of speech
as it relates to schools, universities and the academy; the fundamental right to vote; and
freedom of speech, assembly and petition as it relates to the public square.36 Part III
sketches how courts can adjudicate the sensitive places doctrine using this model.37
I. THE INSTITUTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO RIGHTS
Over twenty years ago, Richard Pildes observed that the “rights as trumps” frame-
work was not descriptively accurate of American constitutional practice.38 Rights are
frequently conceived as a trump card, a way for individuals to prevail over majoritarian
preferences or other utilitarian considerations.39 But that’s only half-true. Rights, he
said, “are better understood as means of realizing certain collective interests” and the
content of rights are, in turn, “defined with reference to those interests.”40 Rights do pro-
tect individuals, but that is not all they do. They also “realize the interests of others,
including the construction of a political culture with a specific kind of character.”41
Pildes suggested that we protect rights to produce certain “public goods” neces-
sary for a functioning liberal democracy.42 Conceiving of them as “trumps” against
33 See discussion infra Part II.
34 For more on this topic, see generally JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A. H. MILLER, THE
POSITIVE SECOND AMENDMENT: RIGHTS, REGULATION, AND THE FUTURE OF HELLER (2018);
Darrell A. H. Miller, The Expressive Second Amendment, in GUNS IN LAW 48 (Austin Sarat
et al. eds., 2019); Darrell A. H. Miller, Institutions and the Second Amendment, 66 DUKE L.
J. 69 (2016) [hereinafter Miller, Institutions].
35 Infra Part I.
36 Infra Part II.
37 Infra Part III.
38 Pildes, supra note 30, at 725, 729.
39 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81, 85 (1977).
40 Pildes, supra note 30, at 731.
41 Id.
42 Id. (citing JOSEPH RAZ, Rights and Individual Well-Being, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 37–38 (1994)).
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any assertion of a government justification is not an accurate description of our
constitutional practice, and, according to Pildes, not normatively desirable either.43
Instead, rights constrain the kinds of justifications that count in adjudication.44
Justifications that work against the public good the right is supposed to produce are
illegitimate; justifications that work to assist the production of the public good are
presumably constitutional.45 For instance, a regulation on speech that frustrates a
central goal of speech—the communication of political information—is typically
thought to be illegitimate.46 Similarly, regulations on firearms that frustrate a central
goal of the right to keep and bear arms—safety—are also illegitimate.47
The public goods that rights provide, in turn, may foster various social institu-
tions, and rights in this context can be best understood as “surrogates for defining
an institutional space with a particular character.”48 Those institutions have various
degrees of thickness.49 We may think of some kinds of institutions—those that are
specified by the constitutional text, or necessarily implied by it—as one specific kind
of institution.50 For example, Congress and the Presidency are institutions textually
specified by the Constitution, but contain all kinds of sub-constitutional laws, conven-
tions, rules, and norms that permit them to function and to resolve differences.51
Of course, not all constitutional institutions are necessarily governmental.
Restrictions on the power to coin money presume a monetary system.52 The freedom
of religious expression implies recognition of religious organizations.53 These kinds
of institutions are recognizable for how they distribute authority or resources, how
they provide rules, decision-making structures, and norms for behavior, and how
they recognize and discipline leaders, members, and outsiders.54 Other, thinner
institutions may arise from social practices that have become so unquestioned and
habitual that their justification appears almost invisible.55 Thicker institutions with
43 Id. at 729–31.
44 Id. at 729; see also TIMOTHY ZICK, THE DYNAMIC FREE SPEECH CLAUSE 19 (2018)
(discussing alternatives to rights-as-trumps).
45 Pildes, supra note 30, at 734 (“Government can infringe on rights for reasons consistent
with the norms that characterize the common goods that those rights are meant to realize, but
when government infringes rights for reasons inconsistent with these common goods, it vio-
lates individual rights.”).
46 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989).
47 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 629, 636 (2008).
48 Pildes, supra note 30, at 739.
49 See Miller, Institutions, supra note 34, at 91.
50 See id.
51 See Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual Am-
biguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1–2 (2014); see also
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 518, 522–23 (2014).
52 See JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 35 (1995).
53 See Miller, Institutions, supra note 34, at 101–02.
54 See id. at 88.
55 See id. at 91–92.
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a private or quasi-private character, can also empower citizens, contribute to repre-
sentative government and act as a check on state-dominated institutions.56
Institutions do not remain isolated, but often form what Douglass North called
an “interdependent web of an institutional matrix” that can be reinforcing, so that
“the individual right becomes more structure-like.”57 Alternatively, rights bearing
and constraining institutions can become antagonistic, which then demands other
decision-making structures, organizations, and protocols to administer those rights.58
For example, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ guarantees of procedural due
process demand some kind of apparatus to provide some type of hearing, including
the personnel, rules, norms, and protocols to provide that process.59 These due
process institutions may themselves come into conflict with other rights-enabled and
enabling institutions—like the press or judicial campaigns—that in turn demand
another set of decision-making structures to resolve.
Scholars have spent the last two decades elaborating on the ways that rights do
not operate as trumps, but instead are interpreted to enable a certain kind of political
society.60 Jud Campbell has remarked that this kind of well-ordered liberty, in which
rights are not atomistic self-referential trumps, would have been extremely familiar to
the Framers of the original constitution.61 As he says, the entire Enlightenment notion
of natural rights presupposed that they were retained to make government function
better; they were individual yes—but subject to collective definition and control.62
Matt Adler has noted that rights are not trumps, but instead are better conceived as
tools to make governments supply the right kinds of reasons for their regulations.63
They are, in his terms, rights against certain kinds of rules.64 Jeremy Waldron has dis-
cussed that rights can generate a multiplicity of duties that have both a negative and
positive character.65 And Jamal Greene has endorsed the idea of adjusting the rights-
as-trumps frame due to its inability to deal with conflict, and its tendency to “favor
rhetoric over judgement, simplicity over context, homogeneity over diversity.”66
56 See Ozan O. Varol, Structural Rights, 105 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1034 (2017).
57 Id. at 1030 (quoting DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 95 (1990)).
58 Id. at 1032–33.
59 This is a slightly modified example from Varol. See id. at 1026–27.
60 See infra notes 61–66 and accompanying text.
61 See Jud Campbell, Republicanism and Natural Rights at the Founding, 32 CONST.
COMMENT. 85, 86–87 (2017).
62 Id.
63 See Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitu-
tional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1998).
64 Id. at 13–14 (“What violates X’s constitutional right, what she has a constitutional right
against, is . . . a rule with the wrong predicate or history.”).
65 Jeremy Waldron, Rights in Conflict, 99 ETHICS 503, 511 (1989) (“A duty to refrain
from interfering with someone’s freedom is likely to be accompanied by a ‘positive’ . . . duty
on other agents to protect people from such interference.”).
66 Jamal Greene, Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 34 (2018).
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Scholars interested in the development of specific constitutional institutions have
built on the rights-are-not-trumps intuition. For example, Paul Horwitz has identified
First Amendment institutions—like universities—that facilitate and effectuate First
Amendment values.67 Other scholars have noted how the Press Clause of the First
Amendment contemplates something other than a right to speech or access to a particu-
lar technology; it assumes maintenance of an institution called the Press that performs
functions and enjoys privileges distinct from other categories of speakers.68 Richard
Garnett and Douglas Laycock among others have discussed the same with respect
to religious institutions.69
Timothy Zick has discussed how First Amendment doctrine designates certain
kinds of public spaces—sidewalks, public streets, and parks—essential First Amend-
ment institutions that facilitate the communication of ideas.70
Joseph Blocher and I have written how the Second Amendment right to keep
and bear arms may be understood within an institutional framework as well—even
after Heller subordinated the militia as an organizing principle for the right.71 In that
context, the Second Amendment is not concerned with self-defense simpliciter, but
the maintenance of public safety, and the institutions designed to provide and
manage that kind of public good.72
II. SENSITIVE PLACES AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT
Accepting that rights do not always function as trumps helps to make sense of
the puzzling passage in Heller that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast
doubt on longstanding prohibitions on . . . laws forbidding the carrying of firearms
in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings.”73 This notion of a
“sensitive place” is still largely undefined. What precisely makes a place sensitive? It
cannot be solely a matter of congestion in the school. Presumably it is as legal to pro-
hibit a gun in a class of five people as a class of five hundred. Nor is it necessarily
67 See Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers
and Hard Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1500–01, 1503–04 (2007).
68 See David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 493
(1983); Sonja R. West, Favoring the Press, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 91, 127 (2018) (“While the Court
has been reluctant to embrace distinct constitutional rights and protections for the press, it
has, nonetheless, frequently recognized and celebrated the unique role the press play in our
constitutional democracy.”).
69 See Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine: What Are We
Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 837–39 (2009); Douglas Laycock, Church
and State in the United States: Competing Conceptions and Historic Changes, 13 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 503, 504–05 (2006).
70 Timothy Zick, Property as/and Constitutional Settlement, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1361,
1427 (2010) (“The public forum doctrine provides that existing public streets, parks, and
sidewalks are held in trust for purposes of expressive activities.”).
71 BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 34, at 3.
72 See id.
73 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
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that the school is on government property: a private school is just as much a school
as a public one. Further, as the Class case confirms, safety alone does not completely
justify carving out these sensitive places.74 Indeed, it is an article of faith among many
gun rights advocates that those places where guns are forbidden are the places where
they are most necessary.75
A part of the answer must be that these places are sensitive because they are the
locus of the production of other kinds of public goods protected by other kinds of con-
stitutional rights, and that the protection of the character of these types of institutions
justifies limits on private firearms. It is not that the “‘the people found there’ or the ‘ac-
tivities that take place there’”76 are less deserving or needing of protection, nor is it
that the people in these places or the activities that occur there are not at risk of
violence. Instead, as between the safety private gun ownership is supposed to provide
and other constitutional values in our constitutional system, these places should be
gun-restricted for them to effectively produce the public goods and political culture
we also consider valuable.
So, what kind of institutions may qualify as a sensitive place under this kind of
model? Religious institutions, educational institutions, political institutions, and the
public square all come to mind: although this model of sensitive places may include
other kinds of institutions that advance other kinds of constitutional rights.77 I reiterate,
though, that this model of sensitive places explains how a place can be sensitive despite
the issue of safety not because of it. The inside of a commercial airliner can still be
a sensitive place without a supporting theory of the constitutional right to travel.
A. Religious Institutions
Religious institutions are one kind of sensitive place, although Heller does not
identify them as such.78 The First Amendment guarantees freedom of religious
expression,79 and in many traditions religious expression happens in groups. Reli-
gious organizations and institutions enhance—even make possible—the kind of re-
ligious expression a person’s faith tradition may demand.80 In addition, religious
institutions are sites of idea generation, social and individual development, learning,
74 United States v. Class, 930 F.3d 460, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
75 See Miller, Institutions, supra note 34, at 82 & n.76.
76 Class, 930 F.3d at 465 (quoting GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 764 F. Supp. 2d
1306, 1319 (M.D. Ga. 2011), aff’d, 687 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012)).
77 For example, to the extent that matters of privacy and substantive due process are con-
centrated in medical facilities, we may think of hospitals and other medical treatment facilities
as constitutional rights-enabled and enabling institutions.
78 See generally Heller, 554 U.S. 570.
79 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
80 Cf. Matthew 18:20 (King James) (“For where two or three are gathered together in my
name, there I am in the midst of them.”); Quran 62:9 (Yusuf Ali) (“O you who believe! When
the call is proclaimed to prayer on Friday (the Day of Assembly), hasten earnestly to the Re-
membrance of Allah, and leave off business (and traffic): That is best for you if you but knew!”).
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the transmission of tradition, and the development of commitment.81 Churches and
their related activities receive an amount of deference and autonomy that is unusual in
other contexts.82 As Paul Horwitz has written, “If any institution is a candidate for
treatment as a First Amendment institution, it is the church.”83
Many, but not all, of these traditions presume that free exercise and physical
threat are incompatible.84 Consequently, many of the regulations surrounding religious
facilities have tried to maintain their character as places of refuge, tranquility and
repose, and as havens from violence.85
For example, religious institutions as places of sanctuary predate the modern era
and is as deeply rooted as any other tradition in Western culture.86 In fact, the idea
of sanctuary arose out of the need to maintain public order and to protect individuals
from private violence, typically at the hands of a victim’s family or clan.87 The sanc-
tuary of the church was so significant in pre-conquest England that early codes
punished breach of church peace more heavily than breach of the King’s peace.88
Lawmakers throughout Western history have attempted to preserve the special
institutional features of places of worship by banning weapons from them and their
vicinity.89 In Nordic countries, those entering a church were to leave their weapons
in a stone vestibule known as the vapenhus.90 Both Henry IV and Henry VIII issued
81 See PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 192 (2013).
82 For example, courts use a different yardstick when determining whether a church official
is a “minister” than it may use for an official of a labor union. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 189 (2012) (noting that the First Amendment
“gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations” and observing that freedom
of religion guarantees a right for a religious organization to “select its own ministers”).
83 HORWITZ, supra note 81, at 192.
84 But cf. Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324, 329–30, 332 (5th Cir. 2013) (discussing
the ceremonial knives known as “Kirpans” worn by Sikhs).
85 See Paul Wickham Schmidt, Refuge in the United States: The Sanctuary Movement Should
Use the Legal System, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 79, 93 (1986) (noting that the idea of sanctuary
within a city or religious building “appeared as a mitigating response to the rather harsh rule
of blood vengeance” in operation in ancient times); see also Deyton v. Keller, 682 F.3d 340, 347
(4th Cir. 2012) (“[T]his crime would be equally offensive at a synagogue, mosque, or any other
house of worship. . . . [H]ouses of worship must be refuges for those seeking guidance, peace,
comfort, and religious fellowship without fear of criminal intimidation.”); Hart v. State, 15 S.E.
684, 685 (Ga. 1892) (“The manifest purpose of [prohibiting sale of intoxicating liquor near
churches] is to secure peace, tranquility and good order at and around these places devoted
to divine worship.”).
86 See Jorge L. Carro, Sanctuary: The Resurgence of an Age-Old Right or a Dangerous
Misinterpretation of an Abandoned Ancient Privilege?, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 747, 759 (1986).
87 Id. at 756 (noting that sanctuary laws “were primarily concerned with the problem of
feud and the maintenance of public order”).
88 Id. at 753.
89 See infra notes 90–93 and accompanying text.
90 STEPHEN A. MITCHELL, WITCHCRAFT AND MAGIC IN THE NORDIC MIDDLE AGES 185
(2011).
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laws that prohibited arms in churches.91 And under roughly contemporaneous regula-
tions, those seeking sanctuary in churches had to shed themselves of weapons.92 The
famous case of Rex v. Knight involved a Protestant zealot who was charged with
taking his weapons into a church.93
This is not to say the historical sources are unmixed on the issue. Some colonial
governments for a time required male adults to take firearms to church.94 However,
these kinds of requirements were geared toward a society still beset by sometimes
hostile indigenous people or during periods of war.95 Overall, it is fair to say that the
instinct to protect houses of worship from weapons—rather than with weapons—is
long and well-established.96 This instinct certainly seems to have become the predomi-
nant form of legislation in the middle of the nineteenth century.97
91 4 Hen. 4, c. 29 (1402) (“It is ordained and established, That from henceforth no [Man] be
armed nor bear defensible Armour to [. . . Churches nor Congregations,] ( ) in the same”); 26
Hen. 8, c. 6, § 3 (1534) (“[N]o psone or psonnes . . . shall bringe or beare or cause to be brought
or borne . . . to any . . . churche . . . any bill, longebowe, crosbowe, handgon, swerde, staffe,
daggare, halberde, morespike, speare, or any other maner of weapon.”) (addressing arms bear-
ing in Wales).
92 See THOMAS JOHN DE’ MAZZINGHI, SANCTUARIES 15 (Stafford, J. Halden & Son, 1887)
(those seeking sanctuary “were not to carry any sword or other weapon, except their meat
knives, and those only at their meals”).
93 Sir John Knight’s Case (1686) 87 Eng. Rep. 75, 76 (KB). The significance of Knight’s
acquittal by a jury is subject to some scholarly debate. Compare JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO
KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 104–05 (1994), with
Tim Harris, The Right to Bear Arms in English and Irish Historical Context, in A RIGHT TO
BEAR ARMS?: THE CONTESTED ROLE OF HISTORY IN CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ON THE SEC-
OND AMENDMENT 23 (Jennifer Tucker et al. eds., 2019), and Patrick J. Charles, The Second
Amendment in Historiographical Crisis: Why the Supreme Court Must Reevaluate the Em-
barrassing “Standard Model” Moving Forward, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1727, 1831–33 (2012).
94 See, e.g., Act of Feb. 27, 1770, sec. 1, 1800 Ga. Laws 157 (“Every male white inhabitant
of this province . . . who is or shall be liable to bear arms in the militia . . . and resorting, on any
Sunday or other times, to any church, or other place of divine worship within the parish . . .
shall carry with him a gun, or pair of pistols.”); see also Act XLI, 1642–43 Va. Acts, in 1
HENING’S STATUTES AT LARGE 263 (Hening ed., New York, R. & W. & G. Bartow 1823)
(“[I]t is enacted and confirmed that masters of every family shall bring with them to church
on Sondays one fixed and serviceable gun with sufficient powder and shott vpon penalty of
ten pound of tobacco for every master of a family so offending . . . .”). This Virginia provision
appears to be more in the style of a militia regulation than a specific requirement to come to
church armed.
95 AD 1622: Powhatan Chiefdom Resists English Settlement in Virginia, https://www.nlm
.nih.gov/nativevoices/timeline/203.html [https://perma.cc/F6FP-JUZ8] (last visited Dec. 4,
2019); see also Treaty of Augusta, GA. ARCHIVES, https://vault.georgiaarchives.org/digital
/collection/adhoc/id/1590.
96 See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text.
97 Georgia, for example, abrogated its prior requirement to carry weapons to church and
forbade it in 1870. Act of Oct. 18, 1870, 1870 Ga. Laws 421 (“[N]o person in the State of
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In 1877, Virginia prohibited any person from “carrying any gun, pistol, bowie-
knife, dagger, or other dangerous weapon, to any place of worship while a meeting
for religious purposes is being held at such place, or without good and sufficient
cause therefor” and forbade anyone from carrying “any such weapon on Sunday at
any place other than his own premises” or pay a minimum twenty-dollar fine.98 Texas
and the then-territory of Oklahoma also prohibited the carrying of weapons “into
any church or religious assembly.”99 Missouri did as well,100 albeit, perhaps, with an
exception for police officers on duty.101
To the Georgia Supreme Court in 1874, the idea of carrying firearms into a house
of worship was socially incomprehensible, and certainly not within the original un-
derstanding of any right to keep and bear arms:
The practice of carrying arms at courts, elections and places of
worship, etc., is a thing so improper in itself, so shocking to all
sense of propriety, so wholly useless and full of evil, that it would
be strange if the framers of the constitution have used words
broad enough to give it a constitutional guarantee.102
Four years later, in an otherwise gun-friendly opinion, the Arkansas Supreme Court
echoed the sentiment: “No doubt in time of peace, persons might be prohibited from
wearing war arms to places of public worship, or elections.”103
In the District of Columbia, Chief Judge Cranch, riding circuit in 1834, while
reviewing an indictment of a man charged with disturbing a congregation by force
of arms, noted that the principle was ecumenical: “Every religious sect is equally
protected by our laws. Every congregation assembled for the public social worship
Georgia be permitted or allowed to carry about his or her person any dirk, bowieknife, pistol
or revolver, or any kind of deadly weapon, to . . . any place of public worship . . . .”).
98 Ch. 6, sec. 21, 1877 Va. Acts 305.
99  Act of Aug. 12, 1870, ch. 46, 1870 Tex. Crim. Stat. 1322; see also Terr. Okla. Stat.
ch. 25, art. 47, § 7 (1890) (prohibiting “any person, except a peace officer” from bearing any
offensive or defensive weapon in “any church or religious assembly, any school room or other
place where persons are assembled for public worship, for amusement, or for educational or
scientific purposes”).
100 Act of Mar. 26, 1874, 1879 Mo. Laws 224 (carrying deadly weapons, etc.).
101 Id.; Huntsville, Mo., Ordinance in Relation to Carrying Deadly Weapons (July 12,
1844) (prohibiting any person, except police officers or those with good cause, to go armed
“into any church or place where people have assembled for religious worship, or into any
school room or place where people are assembled for educational, literary or social pur-
poses”); see also Joplin, Mo. Code § 1201 (1917) (prohibiting any person from bringing “a
dangerous or deadly weapon” into a church, school, or into public assembly place).
102 Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472, 475 (1874).
103 Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557, 560 (1878).
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of God is, at least, a lawful meeting, and as much under the protection of the law as
a political meeting for the exercise of the right of election.”104
This notion of all houses of worship as places free from violence and threats of
violence was reiterated in the Fourth Circuit just this decade.105 In reviewing a habeas
petition by armed robbers of a church congregation, the state trial court remarked that:
[I]f there’s one place in the whole world that you ought to have
the right to feel like . . . for just a few minutes you can put the
dangers of the world away and that you can step to some degree
of peace and solitude and serenity with some degree of safety it
would be in a church.106
The Fourth Circuit agreed, observing that this desire is not confined to a certain creed:
“Religious services are particularly intimate moments regardless of the faith being
observed. . . . [T]his crime would be equally offensive at a synagogue, mosque, or any
other house of worship.”107 That the arms are those of a private party are not neces-
sarily dispositive: “[A]lthough the Constitution explicitly protects the right to the free
exercise of religion from state interference, the government has long taken a role in
protecting citizens from private deprivations of their constitutional rights as well.”108
Although the law has changed in reaction to church shootings, a number of states
still forbid firearms in places of public worship.109 This sense that places of worship
should be free from weapons and violence is reflected in modern polling.110 Over-
whelming majorities of people object to private firearms in churches and other sites
of religious expression.111
B. Educational Institutions
Schools and universities are also First Amendment institutions, tasked with
training children and young adults how to become responsible public citizens.
Schools are something more than a concentration of young people, or a place where
104 United States v. Brooks, 24 F. Cas. 1244, 1245 (C.C.D.D.C. 1834).
105 Deyton v. Keller, 682 F.3d 340, 348 (4th Cir. 2012).
106 Id. at 342 (quoting sentencing remarks of N.C. Superior Court Judge James L. Baker, Jr.).
107 Id. at 347.
108 Id. at 346–47 (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 91 (1971)).
109 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.234d(1)(b) (West 2019) (prohibiting firearms
from houses of worship, but permitting it where the presiding official or officials allow it);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-530 (West 2019).
110 Julia A. Wolfson et al., U.S. Public Opinion on Carrying Firearms in Public Places,
107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 929, 929–30, 932 (2017).
111 Id.; see also Matthew Brown, Poll: Americans United Against Guns in Churches,
DESERET NEWS (Aug. 15, 2012), https://www.deseret.com/2012/8/15/20505566/poll-americans
-united-against-guns-in-churches [https://perma.cc/7VZ7-KCUE] (last visited Dec. 4, 2019).
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students are lodged—they are a place where all kinds of conventions, rules, and
norms give the idea of school social meaning.112
The speech environment that schools foster also has a purpose. As the Court em-
phasized, “[P]ublic education must prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic . . . .
It must inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive
to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-government in the community
and the nation.”113 To that end, vigilant protection of First Amendment freedoms in
school and university settings is essential because “[t]he classroom is peculiarly the
‘marketplace of ideas.’”114 Nothing less than “[t]he Nation’s future depends upon
leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas . . . .”115
Educational institutions are places where a free exchange of ideas in an orderly
and civil manner is essential. Paul Horwitz has written extensively how schools and
universities are “training grounds for public discourse” and the place “where ideas
begin.”116 It is why students possess protections for their speech in school and why
universities and other institutions of higher education can engage in the kind of
content and viewpoint discrimination that would be unacceptable by any other gov-
ernment entity.117 The justification for the doctrine is that educational institutions are
also “unique speech institutions with their own marketplace [of ideas]-enhancing
internal norms.”118 Where school and university regulations “improve, not limit, the
free flow of information and ideas” then institutional deference is warranted.119
To effectuate that goal there is a long history of forbidding firearms in educa-
tional institutions. Harvard University banned students from having guns on campus
sometime around 1655.120 The University of Virginia’s 1825 student rule book for-
bade students from having firearms.121 Mississippi prohibited students from carrying
112 See Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding
of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273–74, 285 (2008); Pildes, supra note 30, at 740–41.
113 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (quoting C. BEARD & M.
BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)).
114 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
115 Id.
116 HORWITZ, supra note 81, at 107.
117 For example, public universities do not have to accept young-earth creationists in their
biology departments or Holocaust deniers into their history departments. See Oller v. Roussel,
No. 6:11-CV-002207, 2014 WL 4204836, at *6–7 (W.D. La. Aug. 22, 2014) (holding there
was no violation of tenured professor’s free speech right when he was reassigned because
of his promotion of creationism and vaccine-autism link).
118 Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 877 (2008).
119 Id. at 880.
120 Allen Rostron, The Second Amendment on Campus, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 245,
255 (2016) (“[N]oe students shall be suffered to have [a g]un in his or theire chambers or
studies, or keeping for theire use anywhere else in the town.”) (quoting a copy of the LAWS
OF HARVARD COLLEGE 1655, at 10 (1876)).
121 Id. at 257 (“No student shall, within the precincts of the University, introduce, keep, or
use any spirituous or vinous liquors, keep or use weapons or arms of any kind or gun-powder.”)
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concealed weapons, and required administrators to punish students who violated the
law.122 Missouri, Texas, and the Oklahoma territory all prohibited firearms in school
rooms and places where persons assemble for “educational, literary, or social pur-
poses.”123 The Virginia Supreme Court has recognized the special place of the univer-
sity as an educational institution in upholding restrictions on firearms on its state
university campuses.124
Private weapons can undermine this essential role of the school as a First
Amendment institution. There is some evidence that highly policed schools suffer
worse learning outcomes, decreased participation by the community in school affairs,
and lack the trust of teachers and administrators.125 Fear of violence may lead to ab-
senteeism or “self-help” techniques, like students bringing private firearms to school,
that can exacerbate problems with fulfilling academic tasks.126 In another study of
university students, researchers found that both non-gun owners and gun owners,
including those who possess guns for purposes of safety believed that allowing guns
on campus would have a harmful effect on classroom debate and the learning en-
vironment.127 And, as with religious institutions, there tends to be lopsided opposition
to carrying firearms into schools and universities among the public.128
C. Political Institutions
Political parties, and the associated structures (elections, polling places, and voting)
are Fifth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendment institutions, and perhaps, also First
(quoting ENACTMENTS BY THE RECTOR & VISITORS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA FOR
CONSTITUTING, GOVERNING AND CONDUCTING THAT INSTITUTION 9 (1825)).
122 David B. Kopel & Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The “Sensitive Places” Doctrine: Locational
Limits on the Right to Bear Arms, 13 CHARLESTON L. REV. 205, 251 n.166 (2018).
123 Act of Mar. 26, 1879, 1879 Mo. Laws 224 (carrying deadly weapons, etc.); Terr. Okla.
Stat. ch 25, art. 47, § 7 (1890) (public buildings and gatherings) (prohibiting “any person, except
a peace officer” from bearing any offensive or defensive weapon in “any church or religious
assembly, any school room or other place where persons are assembled for public worship,
for amusement, or for educational or scientific purposes”); Act of Aug. 12, 1870, ch. 46, 1870
Tex. Gen. Laws 68.
124 DiGiacinto v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 704 S.E.2d 365, 365, 370
(Va. 2011) (“[T]he statutory structure establishing [George Mason University] is indicative
of the General Assembly’s recognition that it is a sensitive place, and it is also consistent
with the traditional understanding of a university.”).
125 Bryan R. Warnick & Ryan Kapa, Protecting Students from Gun Violence, 19 EDU-
CATIONNEXT, 23, 26–27 (2019). However, it is possible that this is merely a correlation and
there’s no causation.
126 See SHANNON WOMER PHANEUF, SECURITY IN SCHOOLS: ITS EFFECT ON STUDENTS
61–64 (2009).
127 James A. Shepperd et al., The Anticipated Consequences of Legalizing Guns on College
Campuses, 5 J. THREAT ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 21, 29 (2018).
128 See Wolfson et al., supra note 110, at 929, 932, 935.
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Amendment institutions.129 The Court has noted that “there must be a substantial
regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order,
rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.”130 Part of that history
of keeping order is curtailing weapons in polling places and during elections.
The tradition goes back to the founding of the nation. Delaware’s Constitution
of 1776 specifically forbade any private person from coming armed to an election,
prohibited militias from drilling during elections, and outlawed any “battalion or
company” coming within a mile of a polling place for twenty-four hours before or
after the election.131 The purpose of the restriction was plainly stated: “To prevent
any violence or force being used at the said elections . . . .”132 In 1776, Maryland
delegates passed a substantially similar resolution, for similar reasons—to ensure
fair elections on forming a new government after independence.133 New York enacted
a law in 1787 that provided that “all elections shall be free and that no person by
force of arms nor by malice or menacing or otherwise presume to disturb or hinder
any citizen of this State to make free election upon pain of fine and imprisonment
and treble damages to the party grieved.”134
These kinds of regulations were common in the nineteenth century as well.
Tennessee prohibited all deadly weapons from the site of elections.135 In 1870,
Louisiana made it unlawful to carry any “dangerous weapon, concealed or uncon-
cealed, on any day of election during the hours the polls are open, or on any day of
registration or revision of registration, within a distance of one-half mile of any place
of registration or revision of registration.”136 Maryland had a similar provision,137 as
129 But cf. HORWITZ, supra note 81, at 254 (“I am not persuaded election law should be
considered a First Amendment institution.”).
130 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974); see also Spirit Lake Tribe v. Benson Cty.,
No. 2:10-CV-095, 2010 WL 4226614, at *5 (D.N.D. Oct. 21, 2010) (“[T]here simply is no
more essential duty of a democratic government than to provide open, fair elections that are
accessible to all eligible voters.”).
131 DEL. CONST. art. 28 (1776), in THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 277 (2d ed. 2001).
132 Id.
133 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTIONS OF THE PROVINCE OF MARYLAND, HELD AT THE CITY
OF ANNAPOLIS IN 1774, 1775, & 1776 185 (1836) (“And to prevent any violence or force being
used at the said elections, no person shall come armed to any of them, and that no muster of the
militia be made on the day on which any of the said elections shall be held . . . nor shall any
soldiers in the pay of this province be suffered to collect at the time and place of holding any
of the said elections, so as in any manner to impede the freely and convenient carrying on
such elections.”).
134 Act of Jan. 26, 1787, ch. 1, 1787 N.Y. Laws 345 (elections to be free).
135 Act of Dec. 1, 1869, ch. 22, sec. 2, 1869 Tenn. Pub. Acts 108 (prohibiting dangerous
weapons at elections).
136 Act of Mar. 16, 1870, sec. 73, 1870 La. Acts 159.
137 Act of Apr. 16, 1874, ch. 250, 1874 Md. Laws 336 (“[I]t shall not be lawful for any person
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did Texas and Georgia.138 The Oklahoma territory prohibited the taking of firearms
into “any political convention.”139 The Missouri Supreme Court said that its regula-
tion prohibiting weapons at polling places was “in perfect harmony with the constitu-
tion.”140 And, as specified before, the Georgia Supreme Court considered bringing
firearms to sites of elections particularly obnoxious.141
Efforts to protect political institutions are not confined to the nineteenth century.
In 1911, special legislation for Knoxville, Tennessee, prohibited any “officer of Elec-
tion or Commissioner of Election” to be “in, at, or near any ballot box or voting
precinct during any election or the canvassing of the returns armed with pistol, gun,
or other deadly weapon.”142
In the pre–Voting Rights Act era, the Court was particularly concerned with
protecting political institutions, including political parties, from private action,
particularly racial discrimination.143 In The White Primary Cases,144 the Court found
that the private discrimination of white party members was sanctionable through the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.145 With passage of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, Congress utilized the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment enforcement
power to protect voters from intimidation.146 For example, this Act was used to force
the Republican National Committee to enter into a consent decree in the 1980s for
in Kent, Queen Anne’s or Montgomery counties to carry, on the days of election, secretly or
otherwise, any gun, pistol, dirk, dirk-knife, razor, billy, or bludgeon . . . .”).
138 Ga. Code § 4528 (1873) (“No person in this State is permitted or allowed to carry about
his or her person any dirk, Bowie-knife, pistol or revolver, or any kind of deadly weapon, to . . .
any election ground . . . .”); 1895 Tex. Crim. Stat. 93 (carrying arms about elections) (“If any
person . . . shall carry any gun, pistol, bowieknife or other dangerous weapon, concealed or
unconcealed, on any day of election, during the hours the polls are open, within the distance
of one-half mile of any poll or voting place, he shall be punished . . . .”).
139 Terr. Okla. Stat. ch. 25, art. 47, § 7 (1890).
140 State v. Shelby, 2 S.W. 468, 469 (Mo. 1886).
141 See Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472, 475 (1874); see also Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557, 560
(1878).
142 Act of July 1, 1911, ch. 498, sec. 45, 1911 Tenn. Priv. Acts 1431 (Records of Election
Commissioner).
143 See Martin L. Levy, The Texas White Primary Cases, 33 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 223,
224–25 (2007).
144 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 729
(3d ed. 1999) (citing, inter alia, Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649 (1944); States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932);
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927)).
145 Id. (“In this sequence of cases the Supreme Court steadily loosened the constitutional
requirements of state action in order to protect the effectiveness of the voting franchise.”).
146 52 U.S.C. § 10101(b) (2012 & Supp.V 2018) (“No person, whether acting under color
of law or otherwise, shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or
coerce any other person for the purpose of interfering with the right of such other person to
vote or to vote as he may choose.”).
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allegedly intimidating minority voters on election day through “ballot security mea-
sures” involving armed off-duty sheriffs and police officers posted in predominately
minority precincts.147
Certainly, there were periods in American history where armed parties descended
onto polling places or marched during election. Sometimes to thwart the franchise—
typically when the ballot was in the hands of an African American148—and sometimes
to protect it.149 That said, these kinds of private threats during elections are more often
understood as manifestations of a political pathology rather than vindications of a
constitutional right.150 The overwhelming legal response in United States’ history has
been to reduce the opportunity for coercion during elections, rather than enable it.151
D. The Public Square
The public square is a kind of First Amendment institution; designed for the
people to be better able to exercise related rights to assemble “to speak” and to
petition the government.152 The idea of a right to peaceably assemble presumes two
things: first, that there is an actual space for such an assembly to occur,153 and
second, that such assemblages must be peaceable, as opposed to disorderly.154
As to the first presumption, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that there are
certain places like public streets and public parks that have “‘immemorially’ been
open to the public for the purpose of communicating and assembling.”155 And,
although the Court has not directly held that governments are required to provide
places for people to assemble for purposes of speech,156 it has indicated that if all
147 Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d 575, 619, 622–23
(D.N.J. 2009), aff’d, 673 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 2012).
148 See, e.g., JOHN DITTMER, LOCAL PEOPLE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN MISSISSIPPI
1–2 (1994) (relating story of Medgar Evers and his brother who were turned away by an armed
crowd at the polling place).
149 See, e.g., id.; MICHAEL W. FITZGERALD, THE UNION LEAGUE MOVEMENT IN THE DEEP
SOUTH 2 (1989).
150 See Kate Keller, Why Are There Laws That Restrict What People Can Wear to the Polls?,
SMITHSONIAN (June 15, 2018), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/why-are-there-laws
-restrict-what-people-can-wear-polls-180969381 [https://perma.cc/3MCT-UW7K].
151 Id.
152 I am aware that these rights have generally merged into one indistinct right of free expres-
sion, with all the resulting conceptual problems that it generates. See ZICK, supra note 44, at 77.
153 See id. at 19.
154 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
155 ZICK, supra note 44, at 122 (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496,
515 (1939)); see also Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 377 (1997)
(“[S]peech in public areas is at its most protected on public sidewalks, a prototypical
example of a traditional public forum.”).
156 But cf. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (“Wherever the title
of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
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public spaces are abolished, private places may take on a public character so as to
perform that function. For example, in Marsh v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held
that a company town that had assumed most of the functions of public government
with respect to traditional public forum had to permit a woman to distribute religious
literature on its property.157 It could not take refuge in the idea that it was simply a
private company.158 “Whether a corporation or a municipality owns or possesses the
town the public in either case has an identical interest in the functioning of the com-
munity in such manner that the channels of communication remain free.”159
Second, those assemblages that do occur must be peaceable and lawful, as op-
posed to riotous and unlawful.160 Efforts to deter unlawful assemblies have a long
history in Anglo-American jurisprudence. During the Tudor era, for example, Henry
VII began to specify the crime of unlawful assembly to counter “the practice for the
gentry, who were on bad terms with each other, to go to market at the head of bands
of armed retainers.”161 Lord Coke’s famous Semayne’s Case, which articulated the
“castle doctrine” in English Law, also noted that a man cannot assemble his friends
and neighbors to accompany him armed to the market to prevent violence.162 And
Chief Justice Holt in 1707 remarked that three armed men coming out of an ale-
house was sufficient to constitute a riot.163
These kinds of regulations to secure the public peace are bolstered by general
prohibitions on armaments in places like fairs and markets—places one would think
part of the “immemorial” custom of public forums. For example, the 1328 Statute of
Northampton forbade riding armed “nor to go nor ride armed by night nor by day, in
fairs, markets.”164 During the reign of Henry IV, there existed a decree that “no [Man]
be armed nor bear defensible Armour to [Merchant Towns Churches nor Congrega-
tions], in the same, nor in the Highways, in Affray of the Peace or the King’s Liege
People.”165 The need to prevent armed individuals in public spaces continued into
the eighteenth century. William Hawkins in Pleas of the Crown included among the
public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions.”).
157 326 U.S. 501, 502, 505–07 (1946).
158 Id. at 502–03.
159 Id. at 507.
160 See Keller, supra note 150.
161 2 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 385 n.9 (London,
R. Clay, Sons, & Taylor 1883) (“It is obvious that no civilised government could permit this
practice, the consequence of which was at the time that the assembled bands would probably
fight and certainly make peaceable people fear they would fight.”).
162 Semayne’s Case (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (KB).
163 See Mark Anthony Frassetto, To the Terror of the People: Public Disorder Crimes and
the Original Public Understanding of the Second Amendment, 43 S. ILL. U.L.J. 61, 79 (2018)
(“If three come out of an ale house and go armed, it is a riot.” (quoting Queen v. Soley (1707)
88 Eng. Rep. 935, 937 (QB)).
164 Statute of Northampton 1328, 2 Edw. 3 c.3 (Eng.).
165 4 Hen. 4, c. 29 (1403).
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things that are likely to strike terror in the people (and thereby disturb the peace)
“the Shew of Armour.”166
General Sickles is famous in gun rights circles for his General Order 1, which pro-
vided that “[t]he constitutional rights of all loyal and well disposed inhabitants to bear
arms, will not be infringed.”167 But he’s also the author of General Order 7, which pro-
hibited any “[o]rganizations of white or colored persons bearing arms, or intend[ing]
to be armed” from assembling, parading, patrolling, or making arrests.168 The case of
Presser v. Illinois upheld a law that prohibited private groups from openly parading
with firearms, aside from the organized militia.169 Modern doctrines concerning the
public square uphold regulations that require protestors remain with their signs to
avoid them being “turned into weapons or used to conceal dangerous items.”170 It seems
hard to imagine that regulations to prevent signs from being turned into weapons
couldn’t be applicable to actual weapons.171
Of course, there’s no general due process right to state protection from private
violence.172 That said, the public square seems unique. First, as discussed already,
the idea of a right to peaceably assemble presumes both a space to gather and a certain
level of order at that gathering.173 The “heckler’s veto” doctrine prohibits govern-
ments from punishing the speaker because of the threatened disorder of the audience.174
Nor can the speaker be charged security and police costs that are indexed to the
anticipated violent reaction of the audience.175 It appears the speaker cannot be forced
to internalize the costs of threatened disorder either directly (by arresting the speaker)
or indirectly (by charging the speaker higher fees).176
166 Frassetto, supra note 163, at 79 (quoting 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 157 (1716)).
167 1 WALTER L. FLEMING, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 208 (1906).
168 Id. at 211.
169 116 U.S. 252, 253–54 (1886); see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,
621 (2008) (“[The Second Amendment] does not prevent the prohibition of private paramilitary
organizations.”).
170 White House Vigil for ERA Comm. v. Clark, 746 F.2d 1518, 1534 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(concluding the regulations “clearly satisfy this element of the time, place and manner test”).
171 Eric Tirschwell & Alla Lefkowitz, Prohibiting Guns at Public Demonstrations: Debunking
First and Second Amendment Myths After Charlottesville, 65 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 172,
189 (2018) (“[E]lected officials have wide latitude within the First and Second Amendments
to prohibit and punish the open carry of weapons where such conduct is likely to intimidate,
alarm, or terrify the public, or cause civil disorder.”).
172 See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (“But
nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life,
liberty, and property of its citizens against invasions by private actors.”).
173 See supra notes 152–54 and accompanying text.
174 See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 542–44 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229, 229–34 (1963).
175 See Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 125–27, 136–37 (1992).
176 See id. at 123; Cox, 379 U.S. at 536; Edwards, 372 U.S. at 229.
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It is possible that the speaker could be forced to bear the security costs. The
government could abandon the speaker to the threats of a hostile audience or force
him to provide his own security.177 But that could have a chilling effect on speech.
That the source of the chill is private (the audience) is not necessarily dispositive.
Monica Youn has articulated a “[c]hilling effect doctrine . . . [that] expands the
category of constitutionally cognizable injuries to encompass claims of deterrence,
whether that deterrence results from governmental or private actions, from legal or
illegal retaliation.”178 She recognizes that there is not a fully worked out theory of
positive First Amendment rights.179 But to the extent there is an inchoate one in First
Amendment doctrine, the right of peaceable assembly appears to be a good place to
begin refining it.180 It involves both an affirmative right to have a space and, when
married to the heckler’s veto cases, a right to have a space of a certain social character.
Other nations with provisions comparable to the right to peaceably assemble under-
stand that it comes with some affirmative right to protection from private violence.181
American doctrine on the issue could edge in the same direction.
To say there is a positive First Amendment right in the public square is not to
concede that the justification is solely about the safety of either the speaker or of the
audience. The doctrine operates whether or not having more firearms in the public
square makes everyone safer and whether the assemblage of persons is three or
thirty thousand. The doctrine of sensitive places in the public square is not con-
cerned so much with whether the individuals that attend such gatherings are safer
or less safe, it is concerned with whether the costs on other margins—the opportu-
nity to participate in public life, to engage others in public spaces with your ideas,
to express unpopular opinions—are undermined by the presence of private firearms
in that space.
177 See Frederick Schauer, Costs and Challenges of the Hostile Audience, 94 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1671, 1683 (2019) (discussing these and other questions as gaps in the doctrine).
178 Monica Youn, The Chilling Effect and the Problem of Private Action, 66 VAND. L.
REV. 1473, 1475 (2013).
179 See Timothy Zick, Arming Public Protests, 104 IOWA L. REV. 223, 253 (2018) (stating that
because allowing firearms into the public square falls within the state’s police power, and the
private behavior is permitted, “[t]his sort of expressive ‘chill’ argument is not cognizable”).
180 See Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment on the Tracks: Should Justice Breyer Be
at the Switch?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1280, 1285 (2005) (“The public forum doctrine is the only
significant exception to the consistent view that the Amendment does not give citizens affirma-
tive claims to government’s resources.”).
181 See Dinah Shelton, The Boundaries of Human Rights Jurisdiction in Europe, 13 DUKE
J. COMP. & INT’L L. 95, 137 (2003) (“The right to freedom of assembly [in Europe] may also
require positive measures to ensure that others do not interfere with the exercise of the right
to freedom of assembly.”); see also Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the Reality of American
Constitutional Exceptionalism, 107 MICH. L. REV. 391, 454 (2008) (noting that the European
Court of Human Rights “has also held that freedom of assembly requires positive action,
including effective police protection, to ensure the right may be exercised”).
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III. RESOLVING CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN SENSITIVE PLACES DOCTRINE
Thus far I have identified four places that can credibly be deemed sensitive for
reasons unrelated to safety. These places are sensitive because they are traditionally
or culturally the site for exercise of rights associated with religion, speech, or political
engagement. As such, they can conflict with other kinds of constitutional rights, and
their institutions that facilitate those rights, including the right to keep and bear arms.
But identifying a point of constitutional conflict does not say how that conflict
should be resolved. A person may want to take her firearm into a school or church
because of a legitimate fear of ambush there. At the same time, students or worship-
ers may find their ability to effectively learn or worship hampered—perhaps even
negated—by the presence of the firearm.182 A group may want to assemble armed at
a polling precinct because of a reasonable fear that they will be confronted by armed
members of another party or by racist terrorists. Simultaneously, voters may forego
their right to vote because they feel intimidated by the presence of firearms near the
polling booth.
A regulation on firearms in these places can conceivably stymie one constitutional
value—the Second Amendment’s value of safety183—and elevate another—the free
exercise of religion, the development of knowledge, the mechanics of representative
government, or the free exchange of ideas. Any candid assessment of the sensitive
places doctrine must recognize this possibility.
The sensitive place designation potentially trades safety for something else. It is,
in the language of John Graham and Jonathan Wiener, a “risk versus risk” scenario.184
Banning firearms in these sensitive places generates one kind of risk; allowing them
generates another.185 The current approach to firearms and the Second Amendment
is frequently afflicted with a “pathological perspective” that seeks to prevent the
worst outcomes of any firearm regulation186 and typically takes into account only
182 Cf. Matthew C. Ward, Guns, Violence and Identity on the Trans-Appalachian American
Frontier, in A CULTURAL HISTORY OF FIREARMS IN THE AGE OF EMPIRE 17, 19 (Karen Jones
et al. eds., 2013) (describing gun use by Quakers or Mennonites as “anathema”).
183 This Article assumes as true the highly disputed empirical proposition that the private car-
rying of firearms in a certain place leads to better safety for the individual and for the society,
a proposition that is not at all self-evident.
184 John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK VS.
RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1, 3 (John D. Graham &
Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995).
185 Cf. id.
186 This can range from fear that an individual will not have a weapon necessary for self-
defense when she needs it, to fear of total government-ordered confiscation of private weapons.
For more on this approach in other areas, see ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE CONSTITUTION OF RISK
41 (2014) (discussing Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 449–50 (1985)).
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one dimension of risk—personal safety.187 This myopic view blinds policymakers
and judges to other kinds of risks.188
A more comprehensive view of gun regulation would understand that there are
risks in all directions. Allowing firearms in schools not only affects safety, it also
affects the First Amendment function that schools have come to perform. The same
thing could be said for guns in churches, polling places, and the public square. Of
course, decisions have to be made, and accounting for all risks would be nearly
impossible. However, to the extent that constitutional law performs a risk-managing
function, the kinds of risks the Constitution itself contemplates seems deserving of
particular consideration.
This next section briefly lays out a taxonomy of constitutional conflicts. It then
discusses methods that courts can resolve them within the sensitive places doctrine.
A. A Taxonomy of Conflicts
When I speak of the constitutional conflict I mean to include both what we may
think of as “the big-C constitution” and the “small-c constitution.” The big-C constitu-
tion is the written document—the text we think of when someone says “the Constitu-
tion.”189 It’s devilishly hard to formally amend; its 7,591 words (or, more accurately,
a fraction of that) is the stuff of Supreme Court cases, elite litigation, and intense
media interest.190 I include in the big-C constitution all the various Supreme Court
interpretations and constructions of constitutional text that we call “doctrine,” un-
derstanding that not everyone agrees that such sources qualify.191
The small-c constitution are the statutes, regulations, norms, customs and other
kinds of institutions that “constitute” the political community in some sense.192 What
makes them “constitutional” is their entrenched nature and their capacity to reflect
“sociopolitical commitment[s].”193 Although scholars differ on specific examples of
the small-c constitution, there tends to be agreement that legislation like the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (at least portions of it) reflect
fundamental social and political commitments that, while not requiring two-thirds
187 See id. at 11.
188 Id.; see also Darrell A.H. Miller, Fear and Firearms, 52 TULSA L. REV. 553, 564–65
(2017).
189 See Thomas W. Merrill, Interpreting an Unamendable Text, 71 VAND. L. REV. 547,
595 (2018) (discussing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STAT-
UTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010)).
190 See id. (The big-C constitution “is the document whose interpretation is at issue in cases
we identify as presenting formal claims of constitutional law.”).
191 See Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408,
413 (2007).
192 See Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 28–30
(1934).
193 See Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional
Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 701 (2011).
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of both houses of Congress and three-fourths of the states to change, would require
an enormous amount of political effort to alter or abolish.194
For purposes of this Article, I also regard the legislative products of constitutional
politics part of the small-c constitution as well. These small-c constitutional statutes are
efforts of legislators to enact policy in a self-consciously constitutional register. For
example, although the non-discrimination provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
are authorized by the Commerce Clause, it sounds in the constitutional values of non-
subordination and equal protection of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.195
Similarly, although nothing in the Second Amendment or Heller requires concealed
carry, numerous concealed carry proposals are expressed and understood as sounding
in the right to keep and bear arms.196 Some of these legislative products are not as
entrenched or as socially accepted as others, but to the extent they seek the status of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, we may think of them as constitutionally aspirational.
Because the barriers for changing the small-c constitution are comparatively
low, it is often the target of norm entrepreneurs—policymakers, social activists, and
legislators—interested in constitutional change. Eventually, some of these small-c
constitutional changes become doctrinal changes to the big-C constitution. For
example, the equal protection principles in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 eventually
influenced the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.197 Experiments with
direct election of United States Senators eventually ripened into the Seventeenth
Amendment.198 The same kind of process appears current efforts to recognize sexual
orientation protections in employment,199 and, relevant to this discussion, efforts to
anchor all kind of gun rights protections into the Constitution.200
The first kind of conflict we may call big-C constitutional conflicts. Big-C
constitutional conflicts occur where both sides have a textual or doctrinal hook for
194 See id.; Young, supra note 191, at 427 (considering the entrenchment of the Social Secu-
rity Act). Of course, current events cast doubt on how deeply entrenched many of these small-c
statutes, not to mention constitutional norms and customs actually are.
195 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 276 (1964) (Black,
J., concurring) (“In view of the Commerce Clause it is not possible to deny that the aim of pro-
tecting interstate commerce from undue burdens is a legitimate end. In view of the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, it is not possible to deny that the aim of protecting
Negroes from discrimination is also a legitimate end.”).
196 See U.S. CONST. amend. II; District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 574–77 (2008).
197 GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: THE CONSTITU-
TION, COMMON LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866, at 70 (2013).
198 David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV.
1457, 1496–98 (2001).
199 Cf. EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 566–67 (6th Cir.
2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 2049 (2019); Hively v. Ivy Tech. Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339
(7th Cir. 2017).
200 Reva B. Siegel, Comment, Dead or Alive: Originalism As Popular Constitutionalism
in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 201–02 (2008).
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their rights claim, and the courts must decide which claim takes priority.201 Free Ex-
ercise and Establishment Clause conflicts tend to have this kind of feature.202 For
purposes of “sensitive places” doctrine, an example of a big-C constitutional conflict
would be something like a prohibition on firearms at the polling station. A place to cast
ballots free from coercion is necessarily implied by the fundamental right to vote and
some kind of right to carry firearms may be presumed by the Second Amendment. A
voter may feel that inviting private firearms in the polling station infringes on her
fundamental right to vote; a firearm carrier may feel that prohibiting a private firearm
in a polling station violates her fundamental right to bear arms for self-defense.
The second kind of conflict we may call big-C versus small-c constitutional
conflicts. These are conflicts where governments have issued regulations that speak
in a constitutional register, but are not themselves directly required by Supreme
Court doctrine. The numerous “pro-gun/anti-gun control” laws passed in state
legislatures as well as proposed federal legislation (like concealed-carry reciprocity)
fall within this category.203 For example, a number of states have provisions that
require employers to permit firearms onto their property, typically parking lots, and
some forbid employers to inquire about the firearm ownership of their employees.204
These kinds of regulations implicate both takings jurisprudence under the Fifth
Amendment,205 rights of speech206 or religious expression207 under the First Amend-
ment, and, perhaps, Second Amendment rights for associations to designate who
may be armed, or a corollary right not to keep and bear arms.208
201 It is also possible that a right can be self-limiting in that one kind of exercise of the right
may defeat another. To the extent the Second Amendment is concerned with aggregate safety,
for example, decisions that lower aggregate safety may be thought of as examples of conflicts
internal to one right.
202 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672–73 (1984) (emphasizing that the Estab-
lishment and Free Exercise Clauses are in constant balance—the state cannot establish religion,
but total separation may lead to free exercise concerns).
203 See, e.g., Sanya Mansoor, Texas Enacts 9 Pro-Gun Laws Just 1 Day After Odessa Mass
Shooting, TIME (Sept. 9, 2019, 10:24 AM), http://www.time.com/5645637/texas-gun-laws-el
-paso-shooting/ [https://perma.cc/3TQA-AP5F]; Laura Santhanam, How States Have Moved
to Make Gun Laws While Congress Is Deadlocked, PBS NEWS HOUR (Aug. 8, 2019, 9:28 PM),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/how-states-have-moved-to-make-gun-laws-while-con
gress-is-deadlocked [https://perma.cc/22KW-WKQ8].
204 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-781 (2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-12-214 (2019);
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-915 (2019).
205 Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. Fla., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1289 (N.D. Fla. 2008)
(rejecting a takings claim).
206 See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1300–02 (11th Cir. 2017) (striking
down parts of a regulation that prohibited physicians from asking their patients about firearms
in the home).
207 See GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1264 (11th Cir. 2012).
208 See generally Joseph Blocher, The Right Not To Keep and Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (2012).
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The third kind of conflict represents small-c constitutional conflicts. These are
conflicts in which the constitutional valence of the legislation is apparent or implied,
but no court has concluded that the policy is required by the big-C constitution. For
example, many states have religious freedom restoration acts (RFRAs) that protect
religious organizations from neutral rules of general applicability.209 The legislature
must show that the generally applicable rule is narrowly tailored to serve a compel-
ling government interest.210 Some of the states that have state-level RFRAs also tend
to have extremely liberal pro-gun legislation.211 To the extent these kinds of conflicts
are solely statutory, it may be that one can resort to ordinary principles of statutory
harmonization to resolve them.212
B. Resolving Conflicts and Sensitive Places
When rights conflict judges must decide how to address them. What kind of
tools can a judge use to address these conflicts? One tool would be to approach the
matter categorically, perhaps using something like text, history, and tradition to supply
the answer. Another tool may be more prudential, incorporating what we may think
of as a sliding scale of constitutionality, adjusted for the constitutional interests at
issue and their related effects. Although this Article cannot address all the permuta-
tions of constitutional conflicts, I will discuss these options with a few examples.
1. A Categorical Approach
A court could aim to resolve these conflicts in some kind of categorical fashion,
perhaps relying on analogies from text, history, and tradition or on some kind of
longstanding practice. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, Justice Scalia in his concur-
rence specified that the scope of the right is determined by the kinds of regulations
209 See, e.g., State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLA-
TURES (May 4, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes
.aspx [https://perma.cc/24U7-3JBP] (compiling a list of the 21 states that enacted state RFRAs).
210 Virginia’s statute, for example, states that “[n]o government entity shall substantially
burden a person’s free exercise of religion even if the burden results from a general rule of
applicability . . . .” VA. CODE ANN. § 57-2.02(B) (2019). The way the state can avoid this is by
showing “the application of the burden . . . is (i) essential to further a compelling government
interest and (ii) the least restrictive means at furthering that interest.” Id. (emphasis added).
211 Compare Gun Laws in the U.S., State by State—Interactive, GUARDIAN (Jan. 16, 2013),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jan/15/gun-laws-united-states [https://
perma.cc/GAL3-YS4F] (comparing all 50 state gun laws), with State Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Acts, supra note 209.
212 See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (“[W]hen two statutes are capable
of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention
to the contrary, to regard each as effective.”).
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that exist traditionally; the constitutionality of a regulation is dependent upon its
pedigree.213 In this model, a court’s designation that a place is sensitive is to conclude
there’s no right to keep and bear arms in that place.214
If that’s the case then the institutions I’ve discussed—houses of worship, uni-
versities, polling places, and the public square—have long been places of firearm
regulation.215 The implication is that any balancing between safety and risks along
other constitutionally inflected margins—like speech or the fundamental right to
vote—have been made already in defining the exception. One need not determine
if prohibiting firearms from the inside of churches really makes them safer, or even
if the religious expression in the church is really harmed by the presence of firearms.
All that is necessary is to determine the factual predicates for the category—whether
we are dealing with a church or a school, or some other category of sensitive place.
This categorical approach is one courts frequently use to address constitutional
conflicts.216 They define the right in such a way as to avoid the conflict altogether.217
The constitutional character of the sensitive place then provides a rule of rele-
vance for analogical reasoning for places and activities that do not strictly count as
a school or church or polling station. That is, the relevant consideration of whether
something is “like” a school, or church, or other sensitive place is not whether it is
made of bricks or wood, it is whether the place is understood sociologically and legally
as an institution charged with producing a similar type of constitutional good.
For example, consider guns at a public lecture hall or at a tent-revival meeting in
a park. If, as I’ve argued here, a school or a house of worship is a sensitive place be-
cause of its First Amendment character, then the question is whether the function of
these other places and activities is sufficiently similar to fall within the category. A pub-
lic lecture hall may not technically be a “school” but its role as a place where people
congregate to exchange ideas, to debate and to engage in the transmission of learning,
may be sufficient to qualify it as a sensitive place. Similarly, although a revival meeting
in a tent may not technically qualify as a “church,” there may be First Amendment
activity related to worship that makes such a site sensitive in a relevant constitu-
tional sense.218
213 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 802 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The
traditional restrictions go to show the scope of the right.”).
214 Granting, as always, that there’s exceptions for necessity in any set of rules.
215 See discussion supra Part II.
216 See, e.g., Greene, supra note 66, at 74.
217 Id. at 73 (noting that the modern Court’s approach to rights conflicts is to assume them
away); see also Niels Petersen, How to Compare the Length of Lines to the Weight of Stones:
Balancing and the Resolution of Value Conflicts in Constitutional Law, 14 GERMAN L.J.
1387, 1401–02 (2013) (discussing this maneuver in American constitutional jurisprudence).
218 I want to reiterate, again, that such places could be sensitive for purposes of physical
safety as well, but this analysis presumes that even if the physical safety issue was irrelevant,
some other factor could still make a place sensitive.
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A second, more difficult issue, is what happens when one of these institutions
attempts to assert First Amendment rights against a small-c constitutional claim to
keep and bear arms.
Some states, for instance, recognize that there’s no federal Second Amendment
right to enter into a library with a firearm, but pass legislation or interpret state law
to permit firearms in libraries notwithstanding.219 The same thing has happened with
other sensitive places like polling stations and churches.220
In these cases, it is possible the rights of the library as a First Amendment in-
stitution would operate not only as a shield but as a sword. In that circumstance, the
special function of the library as a First Amendment institution would permit it to
raise a claim against such legislation, similar perhaps, to the way state universities
or municipal corporations have occasionally asserted First Amendment rights on behalf
of their members or themselves.221
2. The Prudential Approach
Courts can also opt to address these conflicts in a more prudential manner. In
this model, one may decide that a place is sensitive, but for reasons that are more
contextual and consequential than categorical. In other words, the arguments for or
against the designation may be more in determining the actual effect of the exercise
of the right on other kinds of rights, rather than determining whether the facts fit
within a particular preset category of sensitive places.222
In this model of deciding rights versus rights claims, someone claiming a
Second Amendment right to carry a firearm to a public protest, for instance, would
not need to show how traditional that activity was; nor would the defendants seeking
219 See, e.g., Gun Laws in the U.S., State by State—Interactive, supra note 211; see also
Capital Area Dist. Library v. Michigan Open Carry, Inc., 826 N.W.2d 736, 747 (Mich. Ct. App.
2012) (“The [Michigan] Legislature . . . has expressly prohibited local government regulation
of firearms and ammunition generally in cities, villages, townships, and counties, including
in their libraries.”).
220 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127 (2019).
221 See Cty. of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)
(“A municipal corporation, like any corporation, is protected under the First Amendment in
the same manner as an individual.”), aff’d, 907 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1990); Nadel v. Regents
of Univ. of Cal., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 188, 197 (1994) (“[R]egarding the point that extension of
First Amendment protection to government is inconsistent with the notion that the constitution
protects citizens from government rather than government from citizens, our best answer is
that if the unfettered interchange of ideas is a central concern of the First Amendment, then
application of the First Amendment to government speech [in this context] . . . promotes gov-
ernment’s contribution to the marketplace of ideas.”); cf. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (suggesting there’s a First Amendment academic “freedom of a
university to make its own judgments as to education”).
222 For more on the distinctions between these kinds of approaches, see Joseph Blocher,
Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.
375 (2009).
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to enjoin such behavior need to show how traditional it was to prohibit firearms from
the public square.
Instead, the briefing may center on the impact of a time, place, and manner regula-
tion on the person’s claim of safety; the defendant would then brief the impact of allow-
ing firearms on the willingness of persons to assemble, to voice unpopular opinions,
or to express themselves in a place where private firearms are permitted.223 They
may also discuss how permitting firearms by one group leads to the necessity of another
group to think about arming themselves, and the overall affect of that prisoners’
dilemma on the speech interests of the parties, and the rights of the public to receive
the communication.
The brute, and unsatisfying, analysis for this kind of interright conflict would
be simply to ascribe some kind of quantitative value to the conflicting rights and
resolve them accordingly.224 A more refined version may prioritize court-enforced
rights in the big-C constitution as superior to a small-c constitutional right, so that
a core application of First Amendment rights would outweigh any product of con-
stitutional politics. A still-more refined version may be to understand that some kinds
of rights-denominated small-c constitutional products are designed to “count” more
than what we may otherwise think as a non-rights consideration. So we may say that
a regulation promoted self-consciously to protect the First Amendment institutional
interests of the public square, or schools, for example, may count for more than a
non-rights based general police power interest in the weighing calculus.225
However, the problem with that kind of approach, is that, as Jeremy Waldron
has noted, rights tend to generate duties, or “waves of duty.”226 In his example, if an
individual’s free speech rights are sufficient to impose a duty on government not to
censor the speaker, “it is likely also to be sufficiently important to generate other
duties: a duty to protect those who make speeches in public from the wrath of those
disturbed by what they say,” or a duty to allocate time, place, and manner restrictions
that ensure that everyone has a chance to appeal to the same audience.227 Does it make
sense to talk about a right to free exercise of religion without talking about churches
or mosques; or a right to peaceably assemble without a public place where such
223 See Luke Morgan, Note, Leave Your Guns at Home: The Constitutionality of a Prohibition
on Carrying Firearms at Political Demonstrations, 68 DUKE L.J. 175, 213 (2018) (“If the Second
Amendment cannot categorically exclude guns from places where truth-seeking debate reaches
its peak intensity, then the First and Second Amendments are fundamentally incompatible.”).
224 Waldron, supra note 65, at 515 (imagining a hypothetical where “we allow a right to
life to be worth five rights to free speech, or whatever”).
225 This idea shares some relationship to Fred Schauer’s notion of rights as a devaluer of
non-rights considerations; except in this case, a right-based justification for a regulation en-
hances its value. See Frederick Schauer, Proportionality and the Question of Weight, in
PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW: RIGHTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND REASONING 177
n.18 (Grant Huscroft et al. eds., 2014).
226 Waldron, supra note 65, at 509.
227 Id. at 510.
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assembly can take place? A simple quantitative accounting of one right versus another
cannot account for all the duties that one right generates which may also conflict with
other duties. Neither is it a solution to consign these duties to a subordinate role in the
small-c constitution, because, as I’ve discussed previously, rights in the big-C constitu-
tion may of necessity create the duties and institutions that make them possible.
A more refined version of the prudential approach, then, may be to discern what
Waldron calls the “internal relation” between two conflicting rights and to resolve
them by reference to that relation.228 So, for example, to the extent that gun owners
may want to carry guns to protests to protect their right to speak on unpopular topics,
and others may want to ban guns at protests because of their threat to those taking
unpopular positions; the internal relation prioritizes that right that best effectuates
the ability to speak on unpopular topics.229
CONCLUSION
Justice Breyer in his Heller dissent pounced on the majority’s declaration that
guns could be limited in sensitive places, like schools. “Why these?,” he wrote.230 This
Article is an attempt to answer that question. Places are sensitive, not necessarily
because of physical safety alone, but because sensitive places are where gun rights
come into conflict with other public goods generated by other institutions enabled
by other kinds of constitutional rights. As the doctrine after Heller develops, and as
legislators expand all the places and manners in which guns can be carried, we are
certain to discover that there will be more and more areas where the basic conflict
won’t be rights versus regulation, but rights versus rights.
228 Id.
229 See id. at 518.
230 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 721 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
